Missouri Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 1 Winter 1993

Article 10

Winter 1993

Eighth Amendment, Prison Conditions and Social Context, The
Daniel Yves Hall

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel Yves Hall, Eighth Amendment, Prison Conditions and Social Context, The , 58 MO. L. REV. (1993)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Hall: Hall: Eighth Amendment

Notes
The Eighth Amendment, Prison Conditions
and Social Context
Wilson v. Seiter'
I. INTRODUCTION
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The
law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries,
and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries

of a book of mathematics.2

In this passage, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes contends that one cannot
fully understand a judicial decision divorced from its social and historical
context. While this concept in the abstract-may seem an obvious truism to
some, its application to a specific case can frequently provide the legal
community with a fresh and sometimes enlightening perspective on the
evolution of a specific body of law. Failure to take account of this approach
results in the inability of the student of the law to comprehend epochal swings
in judicial interpretation. Moreover, only by exploring the underlying causes
of such swings can the legal practitioner understand and take full advantage
of the law as it stands today, as well as its likely development in the future.
Application of the Eighth Amendment to "cruel and unusual" prison
conditions is one area where such an approach proves to be a useful tool.
This is a body of law where epochal swings in the law reflect changing social
and political values. Traditionally, federal courts gave great deference to state
legislatures and prison officials in the management of prisons and largely
refused to apply the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions.3 The 1970s,

however, saw a general movement away from this "hands-off' doctrine toward
an approach which offered prisoners a modest opportunity to voice these
Eighth Amendment claims.4 This development in the law coincided with the

1. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
2. JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923).

3. See generallyBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REv.

177, 235-36 (1991); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Proprietyand Construction of "Totality of
Conditions" Analysis in Federal Court's Consideration of Eighth Amendment Challenge to
Prison Conditions,85 A.L.R. FED. 751, 753 (1987).
4. See generally Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520; Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 235-36; Landis,
supra note 3, at 753.
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growinFg popularity of the belief that prisoners could be rehabilitated while in
prison.
The Eighth Amendment pendulum swung back in 1991 when the
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter established a constitutional standard for
such claims which, in all likelihood, will be virtually insurmountable. The
Court held that in order for a prisoner to allege an Eighth Amendment
violation on the basis of "cruel and unusual" prison conditions, he must show
that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to his welfare. 6 This
state of mind requirement will present significant proof problems for
prisoners; its development reflects recent changes in public attitudes towards
crime and allocation of scarce public resources.
This Note will first explore the Supreme Court's four major pre-Wilson

rulings on the proper scope of the Eighth Amendment regarding claims of
inhuman prison conditions. This review will show that these opinions, while
containing a great deal of apparently applicable language,7 fail to specifically
state whether a state of mind element is required for such claims. Second,
this Note will describe the factual background of Wilson and the Court's
holding and concurring opinion. Third, it will criticize both frameworks
advanced, and suggest a particular application of the majority's holding which
would ensure continued Eighth Amendment protection of prison conditions.
This Note will conclude by depicting the Court's holding as a manifestation
of evolving social and political factors.

5. See, e.g., MARTIN R. HASKILL & LEWIS YABLONSKY, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 387
(1971) ("A large segment of the public and many authorities view the function of the custodial
institutions as largely punitive, but the more enlightened and hopeful look to these institutions
to rehabilitate the offender."); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
(1968); Algis Mickunas, PhilosophicalIssues Related to PrisonReform, in ARE PRISONs ANY

BEttER? 77-93 (John W. Murphy & Jack E. Dison eds., 1990).
6. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. at 2326.
7. See infra notes 15-93 and accompanying text.
8. Another significant issue which remained unresolved after these four cases was the
appropriate focus of the Court's analysis in such claims-whether a court could find the "totality
of the conditions" violated the Eighth Amendment, or if it was required to find one specific
deprivation which may or may not have been the product of one or more conditions. See
generallyLandis, supranote 3. The annotation states that only the Ninth Circuit followed the
latter approach while the other circuits used Rhodes v. Chapman in applying the former. Id. at
754. Concerning Rhodes, see infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text. In Wilson, the Supreme
Court applied the latter approach, requiring a court to find a specific deprivation. Cf Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
In Robert M. Lapinsky, Prison Conditions: The Eighth Amendment Standard and the

Remedial Authority of Judges, 57 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1387 (1989), the author boldly states,
"In Rhodes, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of a 'totality of the circumstances' test as a

means for plaintiff prisoners to support their constitutional challenges." Id. at 1392.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10

2

1993]

PRISON CONDITIONS
SOCIAL
CONTEXT
Hall: Hall:AND
Eighth
Amendment
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."9 The

Supreme Court has ruled that it is applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment.' ° Before the 1970s, courts only applied the Eighth
Amendment to tortuous punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing

judges, and not generally to any deprivations that a prisoner may suffer during
incarceration. 1 Courts gave extreme deference to state legislatures and
prison officials regarding prison administration, believing that federalism and
the narrowness of the Eighth Amendment required such an approach. 2

However, starting with Estelle v. Gamble, 3 the Supreme Court adopted an
approach which probed the constitutionality of prison conditions. 4
A. Estelle v. Gamble: 5 Medical Care

In Estelle, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment
"embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
16
humanity, and decency...""'
and therefore "proscribes more than physically
barbarous punishments."' 7 The Court wrote, "punishments which are
incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society" 8 or which 'involve the unnecessary and wanton

9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

10. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
11. See generallyWeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. See generally Kenneth C. Haas, JudicialPoliticsand CorrectionalReform:An Analysis
of the Decline of the "Hands-Off'Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 795; Note, The Role of the
Eighth Amendment in PrisonReform, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 647, 654-55 (1971).

13. 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see infra notes 15-33 and accompanying text.
14. Courts also made use of a variety of other constitutional provisions to reform prison
conditions: Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (procedural
due process); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
(1977) (First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right of access to the courts); Monmouth County Correctional
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987) (personal privacy); see generally
Timothy D. Zick & Jeff Trask, Prisoners'Rights,79 GEO. L.J. 1253 (1991). For an excellent
explanation for this development, see Jeff Bleich, The PoliticsofPrisonOvercrowding,77 CAL.
L. REV. 1125, 1146-49 (1989).
15. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The majority opinion was written by Justice Marshall and joined
by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment, and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
16. Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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infliction of pain,"' violate the Eighth Amendment. 9 Estelle instructed
courts to scrutinize the conditions in which prisoners were incarcerated to
determine 20whether they complied with society's conception of humane
treatment.
In Estelle, Gamble, a prison inmate, hurt his back in the course of a
prison assignment and contended that the medical treatment he received for
the injury was inadequate and thus constituted a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights."' The treatment lasted for three months, including a
variety of muscle relaxants and pain relievers, examinations by prison doctors,
and work releases.' However, he claimed that due to his back injury and
high blood pressure, he was unable to return to work.' In response, he was
placed in solitary confinement, where he asked to see a doctor concerning
chest pains and "blackouts."'24 After being hospitalized, examined, and
treated with additional drugs, he was moved to administrative segregation
where he complained of chest, arm, and back pains, but was twice denied
access to a doctor.' Gamble argued that prison officials, doctors, and guards
had been unresponsive to his medical needs.26
The Court ruled that the state has an affirmative obligation to provide
prison inmates with adequate medical care, because a failure to do so would
obviously result in those needs being unfulfilled.
Such a failure could

result in "pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose," and could actually result in "physical 'torture or a
lingering death."' 28 However, for such failure to rise to the level of "cruel
and unusual punishment," the prisoner must show "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs" on the part of prison employees.2 9 The Court
included a mens rea element, because in the context of supplying medical

19. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
20. Estelle was the first case in which the Supreme Court extended the protection of the
Eighth Amendment to a prisoner's conditions of confinement. However, a number of lower
courts had already done so. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (pre-trial
detainee hit by prison guards); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (corporal
punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (solitary confinement); see
generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R. 3D 111 (1973).
21. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
22. Id. at 99-101.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 101.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 101, 106-07. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted; the Fifth Circuit ruled that the insufficiency of the medical
treatment warranted reinstatement of the complaint. Id. at 107-08.
27. Id. at 104 ('[i]t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who
cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.") (quoting Spicer v.
Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)).
28. Id. (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
29. Id. at 104.
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attention to prisoners, "an innocent misadventure" 0 would not be "repugnant
to the conscience of mankind."'"
Applying this standard to the facts of Estelle, the Court found that
Gamble had failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment claim.32 The Court noted that Gamble had been seen by medical
personnel on seventeen occasions, and though an X-ray possibly should have
been taken, the failure to do so fell within the realm of the Texas Tort Claims
Act, and not the Eighth Amendment.3
B. Hutto v. Finney:34 Prison Conditions
In Hutto, prisoners in an Arkansas prison claimed that the conditions of
their confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.35 These conditions
included:
severe overcrowding, lack of beds, a diet of less than 1,000
calories a day, extremely vandalized cells, an inadequate number of prison
guards, and a systematic use of "punitive isolation" which lasted for
indeterminate periods of time.36 Punitive isolation involved the crowding of
as many as ten or eleven prisoners into a windowless 8' x 10' cell that
contained only a source of water and a toilet that could not be flushed from
inside the cell.37 In addition, infectious diseases were spread when mattresses were removed each morning and randomly returned in the evening.3"
In issuing a number of remedial orders, the district court described the
prison conditions as "a dark and evil world completely alien to the free
world,"39 and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment.4" The prison
officials did not contest the Court's finding that conditions in the state prison
system, including its punitive isolation cells, violated the Eighth Amendment.4' However, prison officials did dispute the lower court's order
limiting punitive isolation to thirty days.42 In an opinion supported by eight

30. Id. at 105 (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947)).
31. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)). In dissent, Justice
Stevens argued that the subjective motivation of prison officials should only be relevant to the
appropriate remedy. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded, "[w]hether
the conditions.., were the product of design, negligence, or mere poverty. . ." the only issue
is whether they were "cruel and inhuman." Id.
32. Id. at 107.
33. Id. (citing TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. art. 6252-19 § 3 (Supp. 1976)).
34. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
35. Id. at 680.
36. Id. at 682, 684.
37. Id. at 682.
38. Id. at 682-83.
39. Id. at 680-81 (quoting Holt v. Sonver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)
(Holt II)).

40.
41.
42.
be paid

Id. at 680.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 680. Prison officials also contested the district court's award of attorney fees to
out of the Arkansas Department of Correction funds. Id.
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justices43 and authored by Justice Stevens,' the Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's limitation on punitive isolation, ruling that prison conditions are
"a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
The Court wrote that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits
standards."4
penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense,"46 in addition to
those that "transgress today's 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency."' 47
C. Rhodes v. Chapman: 48 Prison Conditions
In Rhodes, two inmates who shared a cell in an Ohio maximum security
prison brought a class action suit alleging that the conditions of their
confinement were "cruel and unusual."49 The prisoners asserted that "double
ceiling" constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment and sought an
injunction barring prison officials from housing more than one inmate per cell,
The district court agreed with the
except as a temporary procedure."
prisoners 5 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 2 However, in a decision written

43. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's holding, arguing that the district court
had abused "the remedial discretion of the federal courts" that should be practiced in this area.
Id. at 710 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His dissent was joined by Justice White, but only
concerning the district court's award of attorney fees. Id. In a separate opinion, Justice Powell,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, also dissented from the Court's ruling, but only so far as it
related to the award of attorney fees. Id. at 704 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
44. It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's holding in Estelle
v. Gamble primarily because of the majority's inclusion of a state of mind requirement for Eighth
Amendment claims concerning prison conditions. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 109 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (The Court incorrectly applies a standard that "relate[s] to the subjective motivation
of persons accused of violating the Eighth Amendment rather than to the standard of care
required by the Constitution.").
45. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685. In making this determination, the Court stated the length of
isolation should not be "considered in a vacuum," but rather in the context of the general prison
environment (diet, overcrowding, violence, vandalized cells, and "lack of professionalism and
good judgment on the part" of prison personnel). Id. at 685-87. The conditions in punitive
isolation may be "tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months." Id. at
686-87. For a general discussion of the "totality of conditions" approach adopted here, see infra
notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 685 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
47. Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
48. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
49. Id. at 339-40.
50. Id. at 340.
51. 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977). The court made this determination on the basis
of five factors: (1) the inmates were serving long prison terms which would exacerbate the
problems of overcrowding and close confinement; (2) the prison housed 38% more inmates than
its design capacity; (3) several studies recommended that each inmate should have at least 50-55
square feet of living space, but double celling in this prison resulted in the sharing of 63 square
feet; (4) most prisoners spent the majority of their time in their cells; and (5) the prison made

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10
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by Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,

White, and Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
determination because "double ceiling under these conditions [n]either inflicts
unnecessary or wanton pain [n]or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of
crimes warranting imprisonment."53 While the prisons may be uncomfortable,54 the plaintiffs had failed to prove "deprivations of essential food,
medical care or sanitation." 5 The Court noted that each cell was "exceptionally modem and functional ...heated and ventilated ...

[has] hot and cold

running water and a sanitary toilet ... [and] a radio."5 6 In addition, because
inmates were only required to be in their cells from 9:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m.,
the problems associated with a lack of living space were minimal.5
The Court held that the constitutionality of prison conditions could not
rest on a fixed test, but must be evaluated in light of "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."58 Conditions are
to be analyzed "alone or in combination," to determine whether they "deprive
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of human life's necessities."5 9 At
the same time, the Court ruled that such judgments should not be based on the
subjective views of judges, but instead on objective factors to the utmost
degree.' The Court cited its opinion in Estelle v. Gamble and cases in
which it determined whether application of capital punishment in specific
instances violated contemporary values as examples of the use of "objective
indicia" to determine whether the Eighth Amendment had been violated.61
The Supreme Court wrote that it was considering, "for the first time the
limitation that the Eighth Amendment ...

imposes upon the conditions in

which a State may confine those convicted of crimes., 62 While Hutto had
clearly established that prison conditions were within the scope of the Eighth

double ceiling a systematic practice. Id. at 1020-21.
52. The Sixth Circuit stated its holding in a two-paragraph order of affirmance which it did
not publish. See Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 337
(1981). While agreeing that the conditions in question constituted a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court refused to accept the prisoners' contention that the practice of double
ceiling was a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 344. The Court
found a violation of the Eighth Amendment within the context of other specific circumstances

at that prison. Id.
53. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 344, 348.
54. The Court wrote, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons
of [this] type, which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort."
Id. at 349.
55. Id. at 348. The Court scolded the district court for correlating expert opinions with
"contemporary standards of decency." Id. at 348 n.13.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 349 n.15.
58. Id. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
59. Id. at 347.
60. Id. at 346.
61. Id. at 346-47.
62. Id. at 344-45.
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Amendment, the Court stated that it had not considered "a disputed contention
that the conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and
unusual punishment."6

Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, wrote separately to point out that the majority's
holding should not be construed as a "retreat from careful judicial scrutiny of
prison conditions."" Justice Brennan stated that while the Supreme Court
had not previously considered what types of conditions of confinement violate
the Eighth Amendment,65 the issue had been confronted repeatedly by lower
courts, which resulted in prisons in twenty-four states being declared
unconstitutional.' Nonetheless, Justice Brennan stated, courts have neither
usurped state legislatures' and prison administrations' functions nor mandated
"comfortable prisons."67
Justice Brennan's concurrence blamed the poor condition of many prisons
on "[p]ublic apathy and the political powerlessness of inmates," which resulted
in prison officials lacking sufficient resources to ensure humane prisons.68
While it was noted that the cost of bringing American prisons into compliance
with the Eighth Amendment may be substantial, "[h]umane considerations and
constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by
dollar considerations ....,69
While the majority failed to detail the process by which courts should
examine prison conditions, Justice Brennan outlined a simple two-step
approach. First, courts should explore the "totality of conditions," understanding that all of the conditions together have a "cumulative impact on the
inmates."' Courts should seek such information from all possible sources,

63. Id. at 345. In a footnote, the Court stated that it had not ruled on this issue in Hutto
because in that case prison officials had not contested the district court's determination that the
conditions violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 345 n.11.
64. Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring opinion
which largely reiterated the themes discussed by Justice Brennan. Id. at 368-69 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
Justice Marshall was the sole dissenter. Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued
that because double celling was a systematic practice, not a short-term solution to a short-term
problem, and produced "excess limitation of general movement as well as physical and mental
injury. . . ,"it violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 374 (quoting the district court's findings,
Rhodes, 434 F. Supp at 1020).
65. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Court's decision in Hutto, 437
U.S. at 678, provided at least some guidance for this decision. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 368
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
66. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353.
67. Id. at 354.
68. Id. at 358. Justice Brennan contended that these circumstances demanded that courts
continue to demand strict compliance with the Eighth Amendment because only the judiciary is
immune from political pressures. Id. at 345 n.l1.
69. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968)).
70. Id. at 362-63. Justice Brennan argued that the majority had also accepted this test when
it wrote: "[prison conditions], alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal

civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. at 363 n.10.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10
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including experts in public health, psychology, and architecture. 7 Second,
courts should apply "realistic yet humane standards to the conditions as
observed.""2 In short, Justice Brennan contended that the proper analysis of
prison 3conditions focuses specifically on "the[ir] effect upon the imprisoned.0
D. Whitley v. Albers:74 Official Acts to Quell Disturbances
In Whitley, the Court was asked to determine the appropriate Eighth
Amendment standard for a claim by an inmate who was shot by prison
personnel during a riot at the Oregon State Penitentiary.75 The disturbance
was triggered by an attempt of two guards, Officers Kemper and Fitts, to place
intoxicated prisoners in the prison isolation and segregation facility.76
Onlookers believed that excessive force was being used and refused to obey
orders to return to their cells. 7 An inmate, Richard Klenk, assaulted Officer
Kemper, but Kemper was able to escape.7" However, Officer Fitts was taken
hostage. 9 Klenk, armed with a homemade knife, informed prison officials

that one inmate had already been killed and that additional deaths would
follow.8"
Gerald Albers, the prisoner who filed the complaint asked Captain
Whitley to give him a key to the cells which housed the elderly prisoners so
that he could move them to safety in the event of a tear gas assault by prison
officials.8' When Whitley appeared at the barricade erected by the prisoners,
Albers, expecting to be given the key, was instead met by four officers armed
71. Id. Justice Brennan disapproved of the majority's treatment of the district court's use
of expert testimony. Id. at 363 n. 11.

72. Id. at 363. Justice Brennan stated:
The court must examine the effect upon inmates of the condition of the physical
plant (lighting, heat, plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise levels, recreation
space); sanitation (control ofvermin and insects, food preparation, medical facilities,
lavatories and showers, clean places for eating, sleeping, and working); safety
(protection from violent, deranged, or diseased inmates, fire protection, emergency
evacuation); inmate needs and services (clothing, nutrition, bedding, medical, dental,
and mental health care, visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and
rehabilitative programming); and staffing (trained and adequate guards and other
staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions of authority over other inmates).
Id. at 364.
73. Id. (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269,323 (D.N.H. 1977)). Whether this
approach accurately reflected the Supreme Court's interpretation of the proper standard for such
claims is certainly debatable. See supranotes 15-72 and accompanying text.
74. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
75. Id. at 314-18.
76. Id. at 314.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id. Whitley denied having spoken to Albers. Id.
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with shotguns and a number of unarmed officers behind them. 2 Shots were

fired, one of which hit Albers in the knee.83
The district court directed a verdict for the prison officials," but the
Ninth Circuit reversed." Ruling that the Eighth Amendment had not been
violated, a narrow five member majority of the Supreme Court framed the
issue as follows:
Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance...
that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison
staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary
and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on "whether force was
or maliciously
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 86

82. Id. at 316.
83. Id.
84. 546 F. Supp 726, 735 (D.Or. 1982); see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312. The court ruled that

the prison officials' use of force was justified and reasonable in light of the circumstances.
Whitley, 546 F. Supp. at 735.

85. 743 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1984). The court of appeals reversed, focusing on
evidence that the disturbance was subsiding and on expert testimony that the use of deadly force
was unnecessary. The court ruled that
if a prison official deliberately shot Albers under circumstances where the official,
with due allowance for the exigency, knew or should have known that it was
unnecessary ...[or] if the emergency plan was adopted or carried out with
"deliberate indifference" to the right of Albers to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment, an Eighth Amendment violation had taken place.
Id. at 1375. The court remanded the case to the district court to reevaluate the claim in light of
this standard. Id. at 1376.
86. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
The majority's opinion contained a great deal of dicta concerning the proper relationship
between the Eighth Amendment and prison conditions. The most significant and often quoted
passage is:
An express intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required and harsh
"conditions of confinement" may constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless
such conditions "are part of the penalty that criminal offenders'pay for their offenses
against society."
Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a

prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, however. "After incarceration,
only the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"'.., constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." To be cruel and unusual
punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.... It is
obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize
the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that
conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions ofconfinement, supplying
medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.
Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10
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The Court viewed this standard as more difficult for prisoners to meet
than the
"deliberate indifference" standard outlined in Estelle v. Gamble.87 A lower
standard was appropriate in Gamble, because an inmate's right to receive
adequate medical care did not compete with other government responsibilities. In contrast, the Court justified the heightened Whitley standard by the
necessity of considering competing government interests in the safety and
welfare of both prison officials and the general inmate population. 9
The dissent began by stating that the majority had properly summarized
the relevant holdings of previous cases including the tenet that an Eighth
Amendment violation did not require an "express intent to inflict unnecessary
pain."9 However, the dissent asserted that the majority had contradicted this
tenet and established an intent requirement by its holding.9 The dissent also
contended that deciding whether this heightened standard applied necessitated
a very fact-intensive determination92 and the issue should have been presented to a jury.93
E. Synthesis of Supreme Court Cases
Thus, the appropriate Eighth Amendment standard for two categories of
challenges to prison conditions are well settled. Estelle established that the
denial of medical care only rises to the level of "cruel and unusual punishment" if the prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference to the 'serious'
medical needs of prisoners." 94 In contrast, when the alleged violation
involves use of excessive force to quell a prison disturbance, prisoners must
show that prison officials acted "maliciously and sadistically for the purpose
of causing harm."95 In both situations, the court must inquire into the state
of mind of prison officials to determine whether an Eighth Amendment
violation occurred. Unfortunately, however, this is where the water becomes
muddied. It is unclear whether a state of mind element is required in cases

87. Id. at 320.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. The dissent viewed the majority as holding that a violation of the Eighth
Amendment would only take place if prison officials, attempting to quell a disturbance, used
force "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id.
92. Id. The dissent noted that the majority imposed its heightened standard only when "the
injury occurred in the course of a 'disturbance' that 'poses significant risks."' Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
In Hudson v. McMillian,a case decided after Wilson, the Supreme Court ruled that in cases
where prisoners allege excessive force by prison officials a violation of the Eighth Amendment
is established solely by showing prison officials acted with the requisite state of mind; an
examination of the extent of the injury, assuming it was not de minimis, is only relevant to the
issue of damages. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000-01 (1992).
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where the alleged deprivation is the result of the physical conditions of the
prison.96
It is important to note, however, that in both Hutto and Rhodes, cases
involving physical conditions of confinement, the Supreme Court failed to
include a state of mind requirement in its analysis. The Hutto Court ruled that
the defendant prison's practice of "punitive isolation" violated the Eighth
Amendment.' However, it is unclear if the Court chose not to discuss the
issue simply because the practice was by definition inflicted with punitive
intent. In Rhodes, the Court held that the alleged cruel and unusual prison
conditions did not constitute a constitutional violation.98 However, this is
also not conclusive, in that it is possible that the Court did not engage in a
mens rea analysis because the plaintiffs were unable to assert a "serious"
deprivation, the first requirement of such claims.99
Because the Supreme Court had failed to accurately instruct lower courts
as to the proper standard for such claims, there was a notable lack of
consistency in the lower courts concerning the existence and nature of a state
of mind requirement. Lower courts applied the Eighth Amendment to prison
These courts
conditions well before the four Supreme Court holdings.'
usually based their determinations on whether the condition was of "inherent
cruelty," repulsive to contemporary standards of decency, or "excessive."' 0'°
In general, conclusions were reached through an analysis of the objective
conditions of confinement and their effect on inmates.' 2 However, lower
courts have attempted to interpret the four Supreme Court cases discussed
above and adjust their standards accordingly. The result has been that courts
quote the same passages from the same cases, but reach different conclusions

as to the propriety of inquiring into the state of mind of prison officials,0 3

For example, in Lopez v. Robinson,1°4 prisoners complained of double
celling, inadequate heating, poor ventilation, and insufficient hot water for
showers.'05 The Fourth Circuit ruled that such conditions did not violate the
Eighth Amendment because they were not the product of prison officials'
"deliberate indifference" to the prisoners' welfare. 106 In French v.
Owens," 7 the alleged Eighth Amendment violations included overcrowding,

96. See supranotes 15-93 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 48-73.
99. This argument assumes that the holding in Estelle v. Gamble is the applicable standard
for cases concerning prison conditions. See supra notes 15-33 and accompanying text.
100. Danne, supranote 21, at 130-34.
101. Id. at 119.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
104. 914 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1990).
105. Id. at 488.
106. Id. at 490; see also Cortes-Quinesv. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556 (Ist Cir. 1988);
Ducksworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143 (3d Cir.
1985); Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980).
Cir. 1985); see also Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir.
107. 777 F.2d 1250 (7tfi
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use of mechanical restraints, poor medical care and food, inadequate recreation
facilities, and noncompliance with fire and occupational standards. 8 The
Seventh Circuit held that these conditions constituted cruel and unusual
punishment because they resulted in "serious deprivations of basic human
needs." 9 This inconsistent treatment of such claims was finally addressed
by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter.
III. BACKGROUND: WILSON V. SEITER
Pearly L. Wilson is a convicted felon serving fifteen to fifty-five years
for rape"' at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio."'
Wilson, along with fellow inmates, alleged that the conditions of their
confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." 2
They sued Richard P. Seiter, then Director of the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, and Carl Humphreys, then warden of the prison,
in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 Their complaint
listed eight specific conditions which the inmates asserted constituted an
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment: (1) overcrowding, (2) excessive
noise, (3) insufficient locker storage space, (4) inadequate heating and cooling,
(5) improper ventilation, (6) unclean and inadequate restrooms, (7) unsanitary
dining facilities and food preparation, and (8) housing with mentally and
physically ill inmates." 4 The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in addition to $900,000 in compensatory and punitive damages."'
The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment,
finding that while the Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be furnished
adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety,
the petition and supporting affidavits failed to allege that the prison conditions

1990); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988); Touissaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490
(9th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115
(5th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1981); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d

388 (10th Cir. 1977).
108. French, 777 F.2d at 1251.
109. Id. at 1252 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). The only instance where the court
included a mens rea element in this analysis concerned denial of adequate medical care. Id. at

1254.
110. Linda Campbell, Crowded, UnsanitaryPrisonsMightNot be CruelandUnusual,CHI.
TRiB., June 18, 1991, at 5.

111. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2322.

112. Id.at2322-23. Under § 1983, a prisoner may seekredress when aperson acting under
color of state law deprives the prisoner of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law.
See Zick & Trask, supra note 14, at 1281-94. Federal courts may award the full range of
remedies available to civil litigants. Id. at 1293.
113. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323.

114. Id.
115. Id.
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were a result of "obduracy and wantonness""" on the part of prison officials." 7
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination."' While the court stated that some of the conditions challenged by the
prisoners "suggest[ed] the type of 'seriously inadequate and indecent
surroundings' necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation,"" 9 the
prisoners failed to meet the state of mind standard set out in Whitley v.
Albers. 2 ' The court admitted that "state of mind is typically not a proper
issue for resolution on summary judgment," but ruled that the prisoners had
failed to contradict prison management's assertions of "specific affirmative

measures" to provide inmates with "'minimally decent confinement conditions."' The Sixth Circuit ruled that the Whitley standard is met only by
a showing of "behavior marked by persistent and malicious cruelty."" The
inmates sought further review, filing a writ of certiorari with the Supreme

Court, which was granted."z

IV. INSTANT DECISION

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 24 held that for inmates to
present an Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of prison conditions, they
are re uired to show that the prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference."125 A showing of this state of mind element involves an analysis of
the "constraints facing the [prison] official."'1 6 The Court reasoned that a
state of mind element was implicit in the Eighth Amendment 27 by defining

116. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 863 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 867.
119. Id. at 865.
120. Id. at 866.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 867. The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to apply this standard to a case
involving physical plant conditions. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Restrict Suits Challenging
PrisonConditions,N.Y. TiMES, June 18, 1991, at 1.
123. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
124. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2322.
125. Id. at 2326. Because the Sixth Circuit had applied a standard of culpability that was
too strict, the Court vacated the district court's grant of the prison officials' motion for a
summary judgment and remanded the case to be heard pursuant to the "deliberate indifference"
standard. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
126. Wilson, II1 S. Ct. at 2326.
127. See id. In this area of the law, it is not uncommon for courts to treat the "state of
mind" requirement as synonymous with the "intent" requirement. This is confusing because
intent is only one type of mental culpability. Because the standard at issue in Wilson is
"deliberate indifference," this Note will use the term "state of mind" when discussing judicial
inquiry into the mind of the actor.
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"punishment" as a "deliberate act intended to chastise or deter."'2 8 However,
the Court refused to affirm the Sixth Circuit's application of the heightened
Whitley standard, 29 holding that it was appropriate only in emergency
situations when prison officials are forced to act quickly in response to prison
disturbances. 30 Contending that deprivation of medical care constituted a
condition of confinement, the3 Court ruled that the proper approach was
outlined in Estelle v. Gamble.1 1
While implicitly admitting that previous opinions articulated a state of
mind element in cases involving "specific acts or omissions directed at
individual prisoners," the Court argued that such acts or omissions in fact

constitute conditions of the plaintiff's confinement and that a distinction

between the two lacked support. 3 1 In addition, the Court argued that any
attempt to distinguish between "short-term" and "long-term" conditions, only
requiring a state of mind inquiry in the latter, has neither a "logical [n]or
practical basis."'33 Moreover, the Court ruled that such an approach
conflicts
34 with the definition of "punishment," which includes an element of
intent.
The Court also identified-an "objective" component to such Eighth
Amendment claims: the extent of the injury. 31 In order for a court to find
that prison conditions are unconstitutional, not only must the prisoner meet the
"subjective" requirement (state of mind), he must also show a "serious
deprivation" denying "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."'136
A prisoner cannot meet this standard, the Court held, by pointing to "overall
conditions;" rather, he must show the "deprivation of a single, identifiable

human need such as food, warmth, or exercise

....

3'

Nonetheless, a

single unconstitutional deprivation can be the product of many conditions of

128. Id. at 2325 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986)).
129. This standard requires the plaintiff to show that the prison official acted "maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." See supra note 86 and accompanying

text.
130. Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326. The Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment and
remanded the case for reconsideration under the appropriate standard. Id. at 2328. The Sixth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court. Wilson v. Seiter, 940 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1991).
13 1. Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27. ("the medical care a prisoner receives is just as much
a "condition" of his confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the temperature
he is subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is afforded against other inmates.").
132. Id. at2324 n.1 ("Undoubtedly deprivations inflicted upon all prisoners are, as a policy
matter, of greater concern than deprivations inflicted upon particular prisoners, but we see no

basis whatever for saying that the one is 'condition of confinement' and the other is not-much
less that the one constitutes 'punishment' and the other does not.").
133. Id. at 2325.
134. Id. Concerning use of the term "intent," see supra note 127.
135. Id. at 2327.
136. Id. at 2324 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
137. Id. at 2327.
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confinement, such as "low cell temperature at night combined with a failure
to issue blankets."'3
In a vehement concurrencejoined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun,
and Justice Stevens, Justice White argued that prior Supreme Court cases on
point only required an objective analysis of the conditions of confinement.'
Thus, the only Eighth Amendment issue for a court examining prison
conditions is whether they result in "unquestioned and serious deprivations of
basic human needs," which are "without any peneological purpose.""' A
state of mind requirement, the concurrence argued, was appropriate only when
the Eighth Amendment challenge concerns "specific acts or omissions directed
In such cases, conduct by prison officials
at individual prisoners."''
constitutes "conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all;" thus, a
state of mind requirement is proper." In contrast, a prisoner's conditions
even though not
of confinement "are themselves part of [his] ''punishment,
4
specifically 'meted out' by a statute or judge. 1
The concurrence contended that the Court's deliberate indifference
standard, which includes an analysis of the "constraints facing the [prison]
official," will "prove impossible to apply.'"" "Inhumane" prison conditions
are frequently the result of insufficient funding and the "cumulative actions
and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes
over a long period of time."'' 45 Thus, the Court's standard would allow
prison officials to escape liability simply by shifting responsibility to such
third parties.'" The concurrence noted that it is well established among the
lower courts that a lack of adequate funding will not function as a "good
faith" defense to Eighth Amendment challenges concerning conditions of
confmement.""

138. Id.

concurring).
139. Id. at 2328 (white, J.,
140. Id. at 2329 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)).
141. Id. at 2330. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), the Court required
prisoners to show "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison officials concerning the
deprivation of medical care to the plaintiffs. In Whitiey v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986),
an inmate shot by prison officials during a prison riot was required to show that "the measure

taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering... maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm."
142. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330 (quoting Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir.
1987) (per curiam), reinstatedin part,858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
143. Id. at 2328.
144. Id. at 2330.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 2330-31.
147. Id. at 2331 n.3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10
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As a result of the Court's holding in Wilson, all Eighth Amendment
claims by inmates against prison employees must include a state of mind
element. If the grievance involves excessive force by prison guards, the
Whitley standard is appropriate;' 48 if it is based on inadequate medical care

or inhumane physical prison conditions, the Estelle standard is to be

applied.'

The concurring opinion argued that it was appropriate to adopt

the policy followed by some lower courts'50 that distinguishes cases alleging
deprivations arising from "physical plant conditions" from those which involve
deprivations arising from specific acts directed at particular inmates.''

Courts should apply a state of mind requirement only for those cases in the
latter category. Both approaches are problematic; the majority opinion
basically removes such claims from the realm of Eighth Amendment
protection, while the concurrence sets up a framework which would be
extremely difficult to apply. However, this Note contends that if federal
courts apply the majority's standard with a willingness to infer "deliberate
indifference" from the surrounding circumstances and refuse to recognize the
legitimacy of the "good faith defense,"' 52 both of these shortcomings are
avoided.

A. Majority'sApproach: 1970s "HandsOff Doctrine" Revisited
The majority's holding in Wilson does bring a modicum of consistency
to this area of the law. In practice, however, this approach marks a return to
the pre-1960s "hands off' policy that courts applied to defer to the internal
actions and decisions of prison officials. In all likelihood, this will result in
prisoners once again being subjected to prison conditions which offend "the
evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci15 3
ety.'

The majority's determination that an inmate must show "deliberate
indifference" on the part of prison officials fails to take notice of "institutional

148. See supranote 86 and accompanying text. Hudson v. McMillian refines this standard
by eliminating any possible objective component of such claims. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000-01;
see supra note 95'
149. See supra notes 15-33, 124-47 and accompanying text
150. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1987).
151. Wilson, 111 S. Ct at 2330 (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("[N]one of these cases
involved a challenge to conditions of confinement. Instead, they involved challenges to specific
acts or omissions directed at individual prisoners."). For the majority's response, see id. at 2324
n.1.
The term "prison conditions" as used by courts and commentators alike can be further
broken down into five categories: (1) physical plant conditions; (2) established practices of
prison officials; (3) assaults by fellow inmates; (4) denial of medical care to a specific inmate;
and (5) the use of excessive force by prison officials. Id. at 2326-27.
152. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 12 and accompanying text
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deliberate indifference" by prison officials, sentencing judges, and legislatures." 'If a judge is aware of the prison conditions in his or her state, yet
continues to sentence defendants to terms of confinement in those prisons, the
judge is surely being "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of those defendants. 5" In addition, if a state legislature determines the level of funding
for state prisons and is aware that such amounts will result in inhumane
conditions, but passes statutes which require lengthy terms in such prisons, the
legislature is arguably being "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of those
sentenced." 6
The Wilson Court ruled that whether prison conditions constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation "depends upon the constraints facing the
official."' 57 This language is both alarming and contrary to well-established
principles. It would allow prison officials to escape liability simply by
asserting that even though they were aware of the alleged deprivations, they
lacked the financial resources to remedy them. The majority confronted this
issue by stating that policy considerations could not override the state of mind
requirement; however, it avoided grappling with its consequences by stating
that lack of resources was not at issue in this case because the prison officials
had not advanced the argument. 5
It has been well settled in lower courts that in ascertaining whether prison
conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment, "the economic burden
involved in their prevention or alleviation" is not a "relevant consider-

ation." '59 For example, in Wellman v. Faulkner,"6 the court stated, "[w]e

understand that prison officials do not set funding levels for the prison. But,
as a matter of constitutional law, a certain minimum level of medical service
must be .maintained to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment."'
In Ramos v. Lamm," the court chastised the defendants for
attempting to make use of such a defense, ruling that "[t]he lack of funding
is no excuse for depriving inmates of their constitutional rights.'"
However, in light of the Court's holding in Wilson, whether such lower court
decisions still constitute good law is now in serious doubt.'

154. Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 242.
155. Id.
156. Id. The same argument would apply to a finding of"deliberate indifference" on the
part of the electorate which provided the legislature with its mandate.
157. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
158. Id.
159. Danne, supranote 21, at 145.
160. 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984).
161. Id. at 274. In this case, the court ruled that prison officials had shown "deliberate
indifference" to the medical needs of inmates. Id.
162. 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
163. Id. at 573 n.19. The court held that a variety of prison conditions, including
insufficient ventilation, inadequate health care facilities, poor sanitation, and lack of security,
constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 567-75.
164. See, e.g., Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992). This case was decided after Wilson.
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If such a defense is allowed to negate the requisite state of mind element
and at the same time "institutional deliberate indifference" is overlooked, it is
likely that prisoners will have no recourse to the courts concerning such
claims. This is unfortunate because the judiciary, insulated from the political
process and charged with enforcing the Constitution, is in the best position to
remedy inhumane prison conditions 65
B. Concurrence'sApproach: Difficulty of Application
While the majority's approach is troublesome because it fails to account
for the institutional causes of inhumane prison conditions, the concurrence's
reasoning is problematic in that it assumes it is possible to distinguish physical
plant conditions from acts/omissions directed at specific inmates by prison
personnel. In fact, both are manifestations of the same problem, namely lack
of funding and prison overcrowding."6 An American Civil Liberties Union
official stated that regardless of the underlying complaints, the organization
systematically frames cases against prison officials in terms of overcrowding,
so as to capitalize on judicial receptiveness to these claims. 67 For example,
in Morgan v. District of Columbia,68 overcrowding, an inadequate number
of guards, and the alleged indifference of one prison officer resulted in the

attack on the plaintiff by another prisoner. 69 The prisoner broke one of the

plaintiff's molars during the fight, but it was not extracted until the following
day because a dentist was not on duty and prison officials were unwilling to
take him to the hospital. 7 This case illustrates the problematic nature of

the concurrence's attempt to implement different standards for claims based
on conditions of confinement and those based on acts/omissions by prison
officials directed at prisoners. Arguably, the plaintiff's injury in Morgan
would not have taken place had the prison been built to cope with this number
of prisoners, so the conditions of his confinement played a role in the injury.
Furthermore, the injury would not have been as severe had the officer made
a greater effort to break up the fight and give the plaintiff easier access to
medical facilities, both of which are acts/omissions.'

165. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
"[i]nsulated as they are from political pressures, and charged with the duty of enforcing the
Constitution, courts are in the strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be
remedied, even at significant financial cost.").
166. See generally Bleich, supra note 14. Furthermore, the cause of overcrowding is
invariably the lack of financial resources. Id. at 1158.
167. Id. at 1154.
168. 824 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
169. Id. at 1054.
170. Id. at 1054-55. Prison officials did take the plaintiff to the hospital when he got their
attention by flooding his cell and cutting his arm. Id.
171. Id. The court applied a "deliberate indifference" standard and ruled that it had been
met. Id.. at 1058.
Another example of the illusive character of the concurrence's distinction is Lafaut v.
Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987). In this case, a paraplegic inmate complained that prison
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Another example is Duckworth v. Franzen.'72 In this case, prisoners
claimed their Eighth Amendment rights had been violated when they sustained
serious injuries in a bus fire. 73 For security reasons, the prisoners were
chained to their seats, and all but one door was sealed. 7 One of the
inmates was able to escape the smoke, but was thrown back into the bus by
one of the guards.'75 As a result of this ordeal, one prisoner died, and
others suffered "serious," and in one case, "permanent" lung injury.'76 A
court could find that the injuries were the result of the prison officials
chaining the prisoners to their seats, failing to rescue the prisoners quickly,
and throwing the prisoner who attempted to escape back into the bus. In
contrast, a court could rule that the prisoners' injuries were sustained because
of the conditions of their confinement, namely the practice of chaining
prisoners to their seats while riding in a bus. Under the concurrence's
approach, a court finding the latter would not examine the state of mind of
prison officials, while a finding of the former would require such an
examination.
In short, implementation of the concurrence's approach would be quite
difficult. Frequently the claims of inhumane treatment involve both the
physical plant conditions and specific acts/omissions by prison officials.
Moreover, the underlying cause of the injury is usually due to insufficient
funds and overcrowding. While the concurrence's approach is admirable
because it reflects a deep concern for Eighth Amendment protection, it would
prove quite difficult to apply.'77

officials had failed to provide him with facilities to accommodate his handicap. Id. at 390. The

court required a showing that prison officials were aware of his predicament, that it could have
been easily ameliorated, and that they failed'to do so. Id. at 391-95.
A third example is Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,450 U.S.
1041 (1981). In this case, prisoners complained of the following deprivations: cells which
provided one half the square footage of space deemed necessary by some experts in the area,
inadequate ventilation, rodent and insect infestation, unhealthy eating facilities, stained and soiled
bedding, frequent attacks by fellow inmates, and systematic denial of adequate medical care. Id.
at 569-70.
172. 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). The court applied
the "deliberate indifference" standard and ruled that no constitutional violation had taken place.
Id. at 653.
173. Id. at 648.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Some might argue that the majority's opinion suffers from a similar defect, namelythat
its different state of mind requirements for prison disturbances and prison conditions fails to
appreciate the gray area between the two. However, this potential problem will only exist if
courts interpret "prison disturbances" very broadly, a development that does not appear to have
taken place to date.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/10
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C. Inclusion of Objective Aspects in the Culpability Standard
It is clear that a court must explore surrounding circumstances to
determine whether the plaintiff has shown deliberate indifference on the part
of prison officials. As Prosser and Keeton have noted, because indifference
"is almost never admitted, and can be proved only by the conduct and
circumstances, an objective standard must of necessity in practice be
applied."'78 Prior to Wilson, lower courts frequently found deliberate
indifference on the basis of objective culpability standards.'79 In fact, even
though the majority opinion focuses on the "subjective" element, it appeared
to confirm the legitimacy of this concept by stating that "[t]he long duration
of a cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge and
hence some form of intent."'8 0 In other words, if a prisoner is able to show
that the inhumane condition existed for a long time, then it is permissible for
a trier of fact to infer the prison official knew of the condition. This

knowledge coupled with a failure to rectify the inhumane condition could
support a finding of deliberate indifference.

In short, it appears clear from traditional tort doctrine, lower court
precedent, and the language in Wilson that courts will continue to employ
some objective means to determine culpability in Eighth Amendment prison
conditions cases. However, in the post-Wilson cases, there appear to be two
schools of thought as to the nature of these objective means. The first simply

states that deliberate indifference is shown by actual knowledge of the
inhumane condition and failure to remedy it.' Actual knowledge can be
The second requires
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.'
83 an
additional element, namely that the condition be "easily preventable."
Inclusion of this additional element, as contended by the concurrence,
violates a great deal of lower court precedent and would prevent recourse
178. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 34 (5th
ed. 1984), cited in Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining
Responsibility in Section 1983 MunicipalLiability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417, 440
(1992).

179. See, e.g., Cortes-Quinones v. Jiminez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 560 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied,488 U.S. 823 (1988) (knowledge of the practice can be inferred when there isapervasive
risk of harm); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("deliberate indifference" is shown if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the "hazardous risk" and "allowed [it] to continue over time without doing
anything significant to alleviate the risk.") (For the facts of this case, see supranotes 164-67 and
accompanying text); Brook v. Warren County, 713 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Tenn. 1989)
(inferring deliberate indifference from the county sheriff's and commissioners' failure to act to
cure known jail heat and ventilation problems).
180. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325.
181. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824-26 (4th Cir. 1991); Choate v. Lockhart, 779
F. Supp. 987, 993 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
182. Choate, 779 F. Supp. at 993.
183. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992); James v. Milwaukee County,
956 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 63 (1992); Diaz v. Broglin, 781 F.
Supp. 566, 574 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Patrick v. Staples, 780 F.Supp. 1528, 1540 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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against institutional deliberate indifference.'84 When prison officials are able
to escape liability by showing that the inhumane prison condition was not
"easily preventable," a showing of insufficient economic resources would
defeat the prisoner's case. Because the federal government and the states are
facing severe budgetary problems and the prison population continues to
gr6w,'85 judicial acceptance of this "good faith defense" is the functional
equivalent of removing the federal courts' jurisdiction over such claims.
It is important to note that no court has expressly held that inadequate
prison funding constitutes a valid defense. However, in Alberti v. Sheriff of
Harris County, 8 6 the Fifth Circuit implied that it might recognize the
legitimacy of such a defense. The court remanded this case in light of Wilson,
but instructed the district court that state officials' actual knowledge of the
"objectively cruel conditions" and coinciding failure to remedy them was
"strong if not compelling evidence of deliberate indifference."' 81 However,
because of Wilson's order to look to the "constraints" 8 ' facing prison
officials in making the determination of deliberate indifference, the court felt
obliged to support its conclusion by stating that the trial record failed to "offer
substantial evidence that the state's actions were constrained by legislAtive
refusal to fund the [proposed remedy]."' 89
Because the first'approach does not require an analysis of the difficulty
of curing the inhumane condition, the danger of the "good faith defense" is
mitigated. Prison officials will be unable to escape liability simply by placing
By focusing the inquiry
the blame on legislative and executive officials.'
solely on the nature of the prison condition, prison officials' knowledge of it,
and their failure to remedy the condition, this standard ensures the continued
vitality of Eighth Amendment protection of humane prison conditions.
It is not clear which approach will ultimately become "the law."
However, the most logical interpretation of Wilson's instruction on this issue,
to make note of the "constraints" facing prison officials, is to recognize some
form of the "cost defense." When prisoners allege that long-term physical

plant conditions (overcrowding, heat, ventilation, sewage, etc.) violate the
Eighth Amendment, it is difficult to imagine what types of "constraints" face
prison officials other than the lack of financial resources. Thus, in claims
concerning such conditions, lower courts will be faced with the choice of
either ignoring this language by calling it mere dicta or allowing this defense
to negate the deliberate indifference requirement.

184. See supranotes 144-47 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 208-19, 243-56 and accompanying text.
186. 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992).

187. Id. at 999.
188. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
189. Alberti, 937 F.2d at 999. The court also admitted that prior to Wilson, "[i]t was well
established that in this circuit that 'inadequate funding will not excuse the perpetuation of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement."' (quoting Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1044

(5th Cir. 1980)).
190. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to explore the "subjective motivations" of
executive and legislative officials. Kritchevsky, supra note 178, at 461.
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VI. SOCIOLOGIcAL ANALYSIS
As a result of the Court's holding in Wilson and lower courts' likely
interpretation of it, prisoners will face an almost insurmountable obstacle in
their attempts to force prison officials to provide humane living conditions.
Whether this ruling was mandated by the purpose of the Eighth Amendment,
prior decisions, and legal reasoning is debatable. Nonetheless, it is clear that
the Wilson decision was shaped by economic, political, and ideological factors.
These factors converged, compelling American society to do one of the
following: attempt to combat the underlying causes of crime,' develop
alternative systems for dealing with convicted criminals, or greatly limit the
opportunity for Eighth Amendment challenges to prison conditions. American
society, via the Court's holding in Wilson, chose the third option.19

A. Factor I: "Get Tough on Crime"
Incarceration as an approach to crime began as a uniquely American
experiment.
In The Discovery of the Asylum 194 and Conscience and
9
5
Convenience, David Rothman chronicles this development, which for
much of the last 150 years has been viewed as progressive by the international
community, inviting a great deal of interest and commentary.' Traditionally, the philosophical underpinning of this approach was rehabilitation, a

191. Some argue that before prison reform is possible, it is necessary to break the cycle of
poverty, crime, public fear of crime and criminals, increased incarceration, and limited economic
opportunities for disadvantaged groups. See Murphy & Dison, supra note 5, at preface; see
generallyFOLKE DOVRiNG, INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION
(1991) (author argues that in order to prevent a crisis in capitalism similar to the crisis in
communism, American society will need to transform its economy in such a manner so as to
ensure greater economic equality).
192. Evidence of this decision to greatly reduce the success of such litigation can also be
seen in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992). In this case the Supreme
Court made it easier for state and local governments to challenge federal court consent decrees

that governed the operation of govermnent facilities such as prisons. See generally, Paul S.
Penticuff, Note, A New Standardforthe Modification of ConsentDecrees,57 Mo. L. REV. 1391
(1992). Further evidence is the Justice Department's changing attitude toward the Eighth
Amendment, which Attorney General William Barr believes has gone too far. See Ronald J.
Ostrow, U.S. Backs States in Lifting of Prison Caps,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at 13.
193. The United States has the highest incarceration rate among Western democracies as
well as the highest crime rate. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICs BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, IMPRISONMENT IN FOUR COUNTRIES 1 (1987).
194. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
195. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
196. See, e.g., GUSTAVEDE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (Herman R.

Lantz et al. eds., 1968).
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concept that flourished most clearly in the 1960s and early 1970s. 97
However, it was determined that the institutions designed to facilitate this
process were failing miserably, as evidenced by the high rate of recidivism. 98 Thus, society turned increasingly to alternative grounds for

namely, deterrence, retribution, and thd protection of sociincarceration,
199

ety.

In The PoliticsofPrison Crowding,Jeff Bleich contended that the 1980s
witnessed a changing public attitude toward the proper response to crime."'
The author pointed to a growing public belief that government should "get
tough on crime," which resulted in public pressure on elected officials to
develop new policies which reflected these beliefs.20 ' These new "tough"
policies included legislative enactments that (1) required mandatory incarceration for convicted criminals, (2) made incarceration periods longer and (3)
systematically denied parole opportunities. 2"
A good example of this development is the federal mandatory sentencing
guidelines,2 3 which were designed to greatly reduce the amount of judicial
discretion in sentencing, resulting in increased prison terms. "° According
to Melissa McGrath, the legislation was enacted as a result of "public clamor
about increasing drug abuse and distribution, violent crime and repeat
offenders .. . ."'0' For drug cases the Sentencing Commission created a
sentence formula based on the weight of the drugs and not the criminality of
the offender.2" The professed goal of the system was to deter drug use and

197. See, e.g., RoTHMAN, supra note 194; ROTHMAN, supra note 195; supra note 5 and
accompanying text. Coinciding with society's interest in rehabilitation during this time period
was the development ofjudicial willingness to police the constitutionality of prison conditions.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
198. Of the.108,580 persons released from prisons in eleven states in 1983, over 60% were
rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor with in three years, and almost 50% were
reconvicted. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM
OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, AT 1 (1989).
199. See generally Teresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Meeting CongressionalGoals?, 40 EMORY L.J. 393 (1991).
200. Bleich, supra note 14, at 1146-47.
201. Id. at 1149.
202. Id. at 1147.
203. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 STAT. 1987
(1984) (empowering U.S. Sentencing Commission); 52 C.F.R. § 18,046 (1986); see generally
Karle & Sager, supranote 199; Hon. Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examinationof
Emerging Departure JurisprudenceUnder the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1991).
204. United States v. Stockton, 968 F.2d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., concurring);
see Selya & Kipp, supranote 203; see, e.g., Stanley Sporkin, Address at the American University
Law Review Annual Dinner,41 AM. U. L. REv 1 (1991).
205. Melissa McGrath, FederalSentencing Law: ProsecutorialDiscretionin Determining

DeparturesBased on Defendant's Cooperation Violates Due Process, 15 S.ILL. U.L.J. 321,321
(1990).
206. Stockton, 968 F.2d at 721 (Bright, J., concurring).
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"win the- war on drugs;" however, the frequent result has been extremely long
prison sentences and a massive increase in the prison population.207
B. Factor II: IncarcerationRates
As a result of these policies, during the 1980s the probability that a
convicted offender would go to prison increased. 0 s In 1980, there were
roughly 23 prison commitments for every 1000 reports of "serious"2 9
crimes.21 By 1990, this ratio increased to 62.2" There was a corresponding increase during this period in the ratio between adult prison commitments
for selected crimes per 1000 arrests from 196 to 332.212 A significant
portion of this increase in incarceration is attributable to drug-related arrests.
Since 1985 the number of adult arrests for drug violations has increased by 74
percent.2 13
At the end of 1990, the number of sentenced prisoners per 100,000
residents was 293, an all time record.214 This represents a 111 percent
increase from 1980, when the rate was 139.215 As a result of this increase
in sentencing, the number of inmates in state and federal correctional
institutions reached 771,243 in 1990, representing an increase of 134 percent
in the ten year period.2 16 The 1990 growth rate of 8.2 percent translates into
a nationwide need for approximately 1,100 additional bedspaces per week. 17
At the end of 1990, prisons were operating from 18 percent to 29 percent
above their design capacities.21 As of 1992, largely as a result of the
minimum federal sentencing guidelines, federal prisons are operating at 165
percent of capacity.219

207. Id. In this case, the two defendants were sentenced to nearly twenty years for their
first offenses, involvement in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 716, 721.
208. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsTIcs BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN
1990, at 1 (1991).
209. These crimes include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, and burglary. Id. at 7.

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 8.
214. Id. at 2.
215. Id. The per capita incarceration rateshave grownmostrapidly inthe Northeast (167%)
and the West (163%). Id. The Midwest (119%) and the South (68%) experienced less severe
increases. Id.
216. Id. at 1.
217. Id.
218. Id. Because of this overcrowding, jurisdictions reported a total of 18,380 state
prisoners held in local jails or other facilities. Id. at 5.
219. Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits
on the Discretionof Sentences, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1700 n.102 (1992) (citing Attorney General
William P. Barr, remarks to the California District Attorneys Association (Jan. 14, 1992)), cited
in Stockton, 968 F.2d at 721 n.2.
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C. Factor III. Prison Conditions Litigation
As mentioned earlier, the 1970s witnessed an increased judicial
willingness to hear claims of cruel and unusual prison conditions. ' The
result has been a dramatic rise in such litigation. For example, in the mid1980s, prisoner appeals constituted close to half of the cases filed with the
Supreme Court; by 1991, the proportion was past 60 percent. Between 1975
and 1980, prisoners filed 527 lawsuits in the federal district court for the
Southern District of Ohio."' The Massachusetts Department of Corrections
reports that as'of 1990, 60 inmate lawsuits are filed each month, in addition
to approximately 2,000 cases that are still pending. m As a result, the
Department incurs an approximate annual cost of $1 million in attorney
salaries.2" As of 1982, there were 529 local jails involved in litigation
regarding their conditions. 4
In response to these suits, the courts have taken an active role in
addressing cruel and unusual prison conditions and have ordered over 40
jurisdictions to reduce or restrict prison populations.225 As of 1982, 285
local jails reported being under court orders related to crowded prison
As of 1991, prisons in 38 states were under federal court
conditions.'
orders to remedy unconstitutional conditions."' An excellent illustration of
court involvement in remedying such conditions continues to unfold in the
Fifth Circuit's treatment of Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners in Texas
jails. In 1985, after several years of litigation, the state entered into a
"crowding stipulation," agreeing to limit its prison population to 95 percent of
capacity. 8 In 1987, court-appointed monitors reported that the jails were
"clean, well-run and reasonably safe and secure.
However, by the end
of 1988 those same monitors concluded that the jails were dangerously
overcrowded and cited a number of specific conditions in dire need of

220. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
221. Bleich, supra note 14, at 1130 n.17 (citing McCoy, The Impact of Section 1983
Litigation on Policymakingin Corrections: A MalpracticeLawsuit by Any OtherName Would
Smell as Sweet, in THE DILEMMAS OF PUNISHMENT: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CORRECTIONS 224, 229 (Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 1986)).
222. Sally Jacobs, DuelingLawsuits,BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1990, at I. This article lists
a few of the most frivolous grievances such as scrambled eggs which were too hard and
lightbulbs whicl4 were underbright. Id.
223. Id.
224. Bleich, supra note 14, at 1154 n.149 (citing KERLE & FORD, THE STATE OF OUR
NATION'S JAILS 43, 45, 51 (1982)).
225. Id. at 1130.
226. KERLE & FORD, supra note 224, at 43, 45, 51.
227. Greenhouse, supra note 122, at 1.
228. See Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987).
229. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 937 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1994 (1992).
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improvement." In Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County,231 the Fifth Circuit
noted these "dangerous" conditions, but remanded the case in light of the
Wilson Court's requirement of a state of mind element in such claims.2 2
D. FactorIV- Government Spending on Prisons
There is a direct and logical correlation between successful litigation in
this area and increased public spending on corrections. 23 During the 1970s
and 1980s, the amount of public monies allocated to deal with crime grew
dramatically. In 1988, federal, state, and local governments totaled $61 billion
in justice-related expenditures, of which $19.1 billion was devoted to
financing correctional institutions. 4 This represents an increase of 31
percent since 1985, compared with an increase in total government spending
of 21 percent during this period. 5 The percent of total government
spending for justice activities increased from 2.9 percent in 1985 to 3.2
percent in 1988. 6 Total government spending on correctional facilities
increased at a greater rate (65 percent) than any other justice activities from
1979 to 1988 in constant dollars. 7 Criminal justice is chiefly a state
and local responsibility"8 and the above-mentioned increases in total
government spending in this area are most accurately comparable in relation
to state budgeting. Corrections spending grew by 45
percent in real terms between,1979 and 1983, faster than any other category
of state government spending, and almost three times faster than total state
spending. 9 Between 1979 and 1988, state government expenditures to
operate correctional facilities increased by 226 percent in actual dollars. 40
More significantly, expenditures for prison construction rose by 593 percent
during this period.2 4' The proportion of total direct expenditures by state
governments for correctional capital outlays increased from 6.4 percent in
1973 to 15.1 percent in 1988, and between 1977 and 1988, their direct
spending on prison construction increased from 7.7 percent to 12.9 percent.242

230. Id. at 988.
231. 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at 998-99.

233. See Bleich, supra note 14, at 1157-58.
234. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
EXPENDrIURE AND EMPLOYMENT 1988, at 2 (1990).

235. Id. at 1.

236. Id. at 3.
237. Id. at 4.
238. See id. at 2, table 2 which shows $61 billion total government spending on justice
related activities, $54 billion of which was spent by the state and local governments.
239. Bleich, supra note 14, at 1130, 1156.
240. JusTIcE ExPENDITUm AND EMPLOYMENT, supra note 234, at 5.
241. Id.
242. Id:
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E. Factor V- Government Budget Deficits
While the demand for public resources to house prisoners has increased
dramatically over the last twenty years, the available supply of such is
shrinking. By the end of 1991, the federal government owed creditors close
to $2.7 trillion243 and the 1991 budget deficit was approximately $400

billion.'" While having less money to spend, the public demands that the
46
government address problems
conceming4 health care, 45 the AIDS virus, 25
0
24
247
homelessness,

education,

and the environment.2'

banking,

1

the nation's

infrastructure,

At the same time, the federal government is still

reeling from the savings and loan crisis which some commentators believe will

cost American taxpayers $500 billion. 2 2 Furthermore, if current policies are
not changed, the Social Security program will be running at a deficit by 2015,
when millions of baby boomers begin to retire in large numbers.253

243.

BUDGET OF

THE U.S. GOV'T, FISCAL

YEAR

1993, at Part One 287.

244. Paul Craig Roberts, Bush and the Budget: Don't Make a Bad Mistake Worse, Bus.
Feb 24, 1992, at 22.
245. See, e.g., Tom Morganthau, Cutting Through the Gobbledygook, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3,
1992, at 24.
246. See, e.g., Cost SoarsforHIV Treatment, Cal. TRIB., July 23, 1992, at SC (lifetime cost
of treating an AIDS patient in the United States is now $102,000, up from $85,333 in 1991).
247. According to the National Alliance to End Homelessness, on any given night there are
about 735,000 homeless in the United States and during the course of the year, between 1.3 and
2 million people will be homeless for one or more nights. THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC 246 (John
W. Wright ed., 1990).
248. See, e.g., CAROLINE PERCELL, SCHOOLS UNDER STRESS (1991); Vartan Gergorian,
PublicEducation is Still a Radicaldea,NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1992, at 22 (there is a crisis of both
quality and equality in public education); Bruce W. Nelan, How the World Will Look in Fifty
Years, TME, Oct. 15, 1992, at 36 (the U.S. must cope with the "education crisis" or it cannot
expect to be a "major player" in global economic and political affairs).
249. Richard Ringer, S & L Rerun? Banks FearIt's Their Turn, CRAIN'S CHIC. Bus., Oct.
12, 1992, at 4 (as many as 80 banks will be closed down in the first quarter as the government
institutes new capitalization requirements); Donna Smith, RegulatorsSee No ImpendingBanking
Disaster,REUTER Bus. REP., Oct. 23, 1992 (some experts argue the taxpayers will be forced to
pay $75 billion to cover bank failures).
250. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Building andRebuilding,N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 18, 1992,
at 12A (Clinton and Perot both call for increasing public works spending by "tens of billions of
dollars"); Barbara Rudolph, A Quick Fix is not Enough, TIME, Jan. 13, 1992, at 39.
251. See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, FourMillion Childrenat Risk: Lead PaintPoisoning,9
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46 (1990) (author projects that it will cost American society $570 billion to
remedy lead-based paint problem which may cause severe neurological problems for children in
57 million homes).
252. See, e.g., CriticsSayS&L ProblemsAre Understated,ST. L. POST-DIsPATCH, Mar. 29,
1992, at 3E.
253. Jo Mannies, Borrowed Time: Deficit Generates Politics of Paralysis,ST. L. POSTDISPATCH, Apr. 5, 1992, at B1.
WK.,
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Coinciding with these federal budgetary constraints is the aftermath of
Ronald Reagan's "New Federalism." 254 This doctrine involved a transfer of
federal responsibility over many social programs to the states, forcing them
to determine whether to fund the programs or eliminate them. 25 5 The result
has been that many states are finding it increasingly difficult to balance their
budgets and are forced to raise taxes and reduce total spending. 6
F. Convergence of Factors
American society before Wilson was faced with a serious problem.
Popular opinion that criminals should be punished and not coddled led to a
massive increase in the prison population; this led to overcrowding and a
general lack of resources in the prisons. Because courts adopted more probing
standards for policing prison conditions, society witnessed increased litigation
of such claims and frequent court orders to improve conditions in their prison
systems. However, in light of severe budgetary constraints, the government
expenditures necessary to rectify these conditions were not available.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that in order for a prisoner to state an
Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of inhumane prison conditions, he or
she must show that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference."
Lower courts will likely interpret this standard in such a manner as to virtually

eliminate such claims. In order to understand why the Court would deliver
such a ruling, it is necessary to look beyond the text of the Eighth Amendment, prior judicial interpretations, and the facts of the case at bar, to the
social context in which the Wilson Court found itself.
As a result of the convergence of the factors outlined in Part VI of this
Note, American society has been forced to choose among three options:
attempt to combat the underlying causes of crime, develop an alternative to
incarceration, or reduce the opportunity for prisoners to litigate these claims.

254. See generally RICHARD NATHAN AND FRED DOLITILE, REAGAN AND THE STATE
(1987); THE REAGAN RECORD: AN AsSEsSMENT OF AMERICA'S CHANGING DOMESTIC
PRionrrIEs (John Palmer & Isabel Sawhill eds., 1984); THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN
EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (John

Palmer & Isabel Smith eds., 1982), cited in Cristy A. Jensen et al., Implementing Title III:
Assessing Opportunitiesfor State Activism, PUBLIC BUDGETING & FINANCE, V. 10, no. 3, Fall
1990.
255. Jensen, supra note 254, at 54.
256. See, e.g., Andrew J. Corwin & Jay Kingdom Fellow, How Washington Boosts State
andLocalDeficits, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS, July 31, 1992, at 1 (the combined deficits
of 31 states totaled over $30 million, 40% of all counties with populations over 100,000 faced
budget deficits in 1991); Thomas J. Lueck, Deficits Bring More Splits, Less Progress,N.Y.
TIMES, October 19, 1992, at lB (Connecticut, in light of soaring budget deficit, established its

first personal income tax).
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Society, through the pen of Justice Scalia, chose to solve this dilemma by
employing the third option. Unfortunately, this short-term solution is likely
to result in prisoners being housed under conditions incompatible with the
norms and values of a civilized society. 7
DANIEL YVES HALL

257. The avenue which was taken is also unfortunate from an economic perspective. There
are presently over one million prisoners in United States jails, United States Leads in
Imprisonment, ST. L. POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 1991, at 6E, and it costs $18,000 to incarcerate
each federal prisoner for a year. United States v. Quarles, 955 F.2d 498, 505 (8th Cir. 1992)
(Bright, J., concurring and dissenting), cited in United States v. Stockton, 968 F.2d 715, 721 n.3
(8th Cir. 1992). Thus, it appears that the necessary resources to make productive change in this
area are being used in a nonproductive manner.
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